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Abstract 
It is perhaps common sense to argue that stable regulation (and indeed taxation) is, generally, more 
efficient regulation. What is less clear are the wider impacts of instability on taxpayer/ regulatee 
engagement. This paper aims to shed light on the CRC Energy Efficiency Scheme, a UK green tax and 
energy efficiency scheme that targets high-energy consumers in a bid to reduce carbon dioxide 
emissions. By drawing on an original, empirical study on the CRC Energy Efficiency Scheme, this 
paper explores some of the practical and political implications of an unstable, environmental regulatory 
regime.  
Introduction 
Climate change linked to anthropocentric impacts is widely (if not universally) acknowledged as having 
the potential to catastrophically damage the planet. The range of regulatory responses to climate change 
has been varied, operating on multiple governance levels, and taking various forms. One of these 
responses is green taxation. From an environmentalist standpoint, a green tax should be as engaging 
and accessible as possible to allow taxpayers to reap the environmental benefits, whether that be 
increased awareness and information, or an engagement with a financial driver created by the 
environmental tax. From a revenue standpoint, a greater environmental engagement naturally leads to 
a drop-in tax revenue as the environmentally harmful base being taxed grows smaller (for example 
waste,1 or energy2). There is therefore a delicate balance at play between the environmental and revenue 
functions of environmental taxation. This paper tells the story of the CRC Energy Efficiency Scheme 
(the CRC);3 a green tax introduced to target energy and help contribute to climate change targets. The 
revenue element of the CRC is also not to be dismissed, as the tax brings in almost £1bn to the Treasury 
each year.  
The central premise of this paper draws on the idea that constantly changing regulation is inefficient 
regulation.4 It might seem like common sense to say that unstable regulation is inefficient regulation, 
but what is less clear, is the wide-ranging impacts that an unstable environmental tax regime have on 
regulatees. Drawing upon an original study on the CRC, we will work through some of the practical 
impacts that stem from instability, as well as exploring the emotive responses of regulatees to consider 
how its instability has negatively affected levels of regulatee engagement. As such, this paper has wide-
ranging interest for policy-makers and scholars alike. By exploring the story of the CRC, as told by the 
regulatee, lessons can be learnt for future regulatory regimes, environmental or otherwise.  
                                                          
1 As in the Landfill Tax. 
2 See for example the Carbon Reduction Commitment, or the Climate Change Levy. 
3 The CRC was not introduced in primary legislation. There may be some questions as to whether the CRC is 
actually a tax. For the purposes of this paper, it will be assumed that the CRC is a tax or in the very least, a de 
facto tax. Indeed, in the recent Spring Budget, the CRC was dealt with under “energy and environment taxes”; 
HM Treasury, Spring Budget (2016), at 7.32. See also a previous discussion of this in: A. Lawton, “Green 
Taxation Theory in Practice: the 2012 Reforms of the Carbon Reduction Commitment” (2016) 18(2) ELR 126. 
4 For a general discussion of “good regulation” see R Baldwin, M Cave and M Lodge, Understanding 
regulation: Theory, strategy and practice (2nd Edition) (OUP, 2012); R Baldwin, M Cave and M Lodge, The 
Oxford Handbook of Regulation (OUP, 2010) and, M. Lodge and K. Wegrich, Managing Regulation: 
Regulatory Analysis, Politics and Policy (Palgrave MacMillan, 2012). 




By way of summary, CRC participants are required to purchase and surrender one allowance per tonne 
of carbon dioxide that they emit;5 and the revenue from the surrendering of these allowances goes to 
the Treasury.6 What makes the CRC such an interesting example of regulatory efficiency is that the 
regime has been altered by successive governments on an almost annual basis since its inception in 
2010. These reforms include: the first CRC order in 2010;7 a 2012 consultation;8 a series of reforms in 
2013;9 a further consultation in 2015;10 as well as two additional amendment orders.11 In March 2016, 
the abolition of the CRC was announced in the Spring Budget.12 As such, the CRC will end following 
the 2018-2019 compliance year,13 and will be replaced by the Climate Change Levy to recoup the lost 
revenue.14 
Academic literature tells us that tax stability is important on three key levels: stability of the rule of 
law;15 stability of property rights;16 and institutional stability.17 This paper will draw on all three areas 
to highlight the consequences caused by the CRC’s instability. Further, a theory with particular 
resonance with the lessons learnt from the CRC is put forward by Hayek, which states that: 
“But the important point is that all coercive action of government must be 
unambiguously determined by a permanent legal framework which enables the 
individual to plan with a degree of confidence and which reduces human 
uncertainty as much as possible.”18 
Deriving from legal literature on the rule of law, Hayek focuses on the need to achieve a permanent 
legal framework, in which there is an unchanging body of rules to provide certainty for those subject to 
them.  This paper will further argue that the instability of the CRC has led to several common sense 
practical impacts including, but not limited to, lower levels of engagement and understanding. What is 
even more interesting is the fact that taxpayers are aware, take note and follow tax instability. An 
unstable tax regime contributed to the perception and opinion formed about them. Stokes looks at how 
a regulatory regime is packaged and why this is important. Her work considers the role of the regulatory 
domain and the regulatory dexterity.19 When considering her ideas in light of stability, the regulatory 
domain is the stable and the dexterity is the changing. The presence of a regulatory domain can 
communicate the adequacy of a regulatory regime (such as the case with fracking, where the 
government has chosen to rely on existing laws to regulate the area)20 or inadequacies (such as 
stagnation). Through a combination of economic theory and regulatory packaging, this paper posits a 
novel method to analyse environmental taxation and environmental regulation more generally.  
                                                          
5 The CRC is very complex and this is a simplification of the scheme for understanding purposes. Full details of 
the scheme available at: The CRC Energy Efficiency Scheme Order 2013 (2013/1119). 
6 HM Treasury, ‘Spending Review 2010’, 62. 
7 The CRC Energy Efficiency Scheme Order 2010 (2010/768). 
8 DECC, ‘Consultation on simplifying the CRC Energy Efficiency Scheme’ (March 2012). 
9 DECC, ‘Government Response to the Consultation on simplifying the CRC Energy Efficiency Scheme’ 
(December 2012); implemented in The CRC Energy Efficiency Scheme Order 2013 (2013/1119). 
10 HM Treasury, ‘Reforming the Business Energy Efficiency Tax Landscape’ (September 2015). 
11 CRC Energy Efficiency (Amendment) Order 2011 (SI 2011/234); CRC Energy Efficiency (Amendment) 
Order 2014 (SI 2014/502). 
12 HM Treasury, ‘Policy Paper: Spring Budget’ (2016) at para. 4.14. 
13 HM Treasury, ‘Reforming the business energy efficiency tax landscape: response to the consultation’ (March 
2016) at para. 3.4. 
14 HM Treasury, above fn.12, para. 3.5. 
15 FA. Hayek (edited by R. Hamowy), The Constitution of Liberty (University of Chicago Press, 2011) 
16 W. Lippmann, The Good Society (Transaction 1938)  
17 D. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (CUP 1990) 
18 Hayek, above fn.15 at 331-332 
19 E. Stokes, ‘Regulatory Domain and Regulatory Dexterity: Critiquing the UK Governance of ‘Fracking’’ 
(2016) 79(6) MLR 961 
20 Stokes, above fn.19 




Overall, the story that this paper tells starts with a practical impact of instability: a burden on resources. 
Higher rates of instability produce increased costs in time and money for regulatees as they struggle to 
keep up with changes to the scheme. Increased instability produces a drop-in regulatee engagement. 
The tax has a dual motive in reducing carbon emissions but also seeks to alter the behaviour of the 
taxpayer. A drop in engagement caused by instability arguably produces a smaller behaviour shift. In 
addition, the instability of the CRC has broader impacts on how the government is perceived. When 
regulatees perceive what are, in their eyes, unnecessary changes to the CRC, they attribute a level of 
blame on the government. This negative emotion undermines the motives of the government and 
undermines the wider green policy that overarches the CRC scheme. To combat this, policymakers 
should consider how the CRC has been packaged to regulatees. Instability forms part of this package. 
By introducing a level of stability, much in the same way as the regulatory domain put forward by 
Stokes, policymakers could communicate a legitimate green policy to regulatees that can be engaged 
with.  
This paper will first introduce the CRC scheme and its changes to readers. Next, I will turn to the 
methodology behind the study on the CRC on which this paper is based.  In the third part of this paper, 
the story of the CRC and its instability will be told in two parts. First, this paper will consider the 
practical impacts of instability on the scheme: that regulatees are unable or less willing to engage with 
the scheme. Second, that the perceived instability is linked back to policymakers in the regulatees’ eyes; 
and that this has wider repercussions for the whole of green policy. Finally, this paper will draw together 
the story of the CRC, arguing that policymakers must promote a stable, regulatory domain for green 
policy. Individual regime stability contributes to this image of stable green policy. 
 
The Carbon Reduction Commitment  
The CRC targets high consumers of energy (not already covered by other climate change linked 
regulatory schemes, such as Climate Change Agreements,21 or the European Emissions Trading 
Scheme),22 to reduce their carbon emissions. Once a participant meets the qualification criteria for the 
scheme (consumption over 6000MWh of energy, and a special type of meter fitted to read energy 
consumption),23 the scheme is mandatory, and the participant must register for the CRC and comply.  
The CRC operates by effectively taxing participants on their carbon emissions,24 through the purchase 
and surrender of allowances. The participant is required to purchase and surrender one allowance for 
every tonne of carbon dioxide emitted.25 A difficulty with the CRC lies in the fact that it bases its initial 
measurements on energy consumption (i.e. qualification is based on energy consumption), yet the tax 
is based on carbon emissions. This requires participants to convert their energy consumption into 
emissions data using government issued emissions factors.26 In England, the CRC is enforced and 
regulated by the Environment Agency.27 
                                                          
21 "Climate change agreements are voluntary agreements made by UK industry and the Environment Agency to 
reduce energy use and carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions. In return, operators receive a discount on the Climate 
Change Levy (CCL), a tax added to electricity and fuel bills." Definition source: https://www.gov.uk/climate-
change-agreements--2 accessed 13/07/2015 
22 The CRC Energy Efficiency Scheme Order (2013/1119), schedule 1, paragraphs 28 and 29 
23 CRC Order 2013, article 3 
24 I say effectively because a) there are debates as to whether the CRC is a tax; and b) the ‘tax’ is raised through 
the purchase of allowances, rather than through a tax bill. 
25 The CRC Energy Efficiency Scheme Order (2013/1119), article 36(1). 
26 The CRC Energy Efficiency Scheme Order (2013/1119), article 33(1) and schedule 1, paragraph 33. 
27 Above n.12, Article 9; for Wales, this is the Natural Resources Body; for Scotland, this is the Scottish 
Environment Protection Agency; and for Northern Ireland, this is the chief inspector.  




The regular changes to the CRC form the contextual foundation to this paper. Initially, the CRC was 
criticised by the Coalition Government for its “administrative burdens” and complexity. 28 The scheme 
as originally conceived covered almost 30 fuels, required reporting on 90% of emissions (as opposed 
to 100% reporting), and ranked participants in an annual League Table based upon their performance. 
Following a public consultation, the CRC was reformed significantly in 2013, “to streamline and 
simplify the scheme to create a leaner, simplified and refocused CRC.”29 Reforms of note include a 
drop in the scope of the CRC from 19 fuels to two (electricity and gas) and the abolition of the 
Performance League Table. For the large part, these changes came into effect at the start of the second 
phase in 2014. Since then, the CRC Energy Efficiency (Amendment) Order 2014 has come into force, 
making smaller changes to the scheme.30 Finally, in 2016, the scheme was abolished, as part of a larger 
energy tax reform, and the CRC will end following the 2018-2019 compliance year.31 It is following 
the announcement of the CRC’s abolition that the main part of the CRC study took place.  
Although the CRC will now end in 2019, it nevertheless provides an interesting case study of green 
taxes. In addition, the Climate Change Levy will be expanding to cover the scope of the CRC from 
2019 onwards meaning questions of regulatee engagement and regulatee behaviour in this field will 
continue to resonate beyond the time of the CRC. These insights into regulatees and how they react to 
regulation will have a wider application to other green taxes, and is especially important given the lack 
of empirical socio-legal work in environmental law.32 
 
Methodology 
Two phases of interviews were undertaken for this study: a pilot study; and a main study.33 The initial 
pilot study of 8 interviews was undertaken between October and December 2015. The interviewees for 
the pilot study were all university participants of the CRC and were selected at random to be contacted. 
This was done by collating each university participant, identified through the CRC 2013-2014 Annual 
Report Publication,34 onto a spreadsheet and using a random number generator to generate the 
corresponding university to be contacted.35 Out of 50 universities contacted by email, 8 positive 
responses were received, and the interviews took place both over the phone and face-to-face. The 
interviews were semi-structured, using an interview schedule as a basis.36 
Following this pilot, a further 23 interviews were completed between January and April 2016. Initially, 
recruitment for these interviews was done at random by letter (again using the ARP and a random 
number generator). Despite 90 letters being sent to participants of the CRC, no positive responses, and 
only one negative response was received. This was disappointing.37 I then contacted the regulator for 
                                                          
28 DECC, ‘Consultation on simplifying the CRC Energy Efficiency Scheme’ (March 2012) 6. 
29 DECC, above fn.28, at 6 and 11. 
30 CRC Energy Efficiency Scheme (Amendment) Order 2014 (SI 2014/502). 
31 HM Treasury, ‘Budget 2016’, para 4.14. 
32 On which, see: E. Fisher et al., ‘Maturity and Methodology: Starting a Debate about Environmental Law 
Scholarship’ (2009) 21 JEL 213. 
33 H. Sampson, ‘Navigating the waves: the usefulness of a pilot in qualitative research.’ (2004) 4(3) Qualitative 
Research 383-402. 
34 Available via: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/crc-annual-report-publication-2013-to-2014  
accessed December 15, 2016. 
35 J. Ritchie et al., ‘Designing and Selecting Samples’ in C. McNaughton Nicholls, and R. Ormston, 
(eds) Qualitative research practice: A guide for social science students and researchers (Sage, 2013). 
36 S. Kvale, Doing interviews (Sage, 2008); K. Roulston, Reflective interviewing: A guide to theory and practice 
(Sage, 2010). 
37 Y. Baruch and BC. Holtom, ‘Survey response rate levels and trends in organizational research’ (2008) 
61(8) Human relations 1139-1160. 




the scheme and asked for an advert to be placed in the regulatee newsletter.38 This approach was more 
fruitful. The interviewees for the main part of the study were therefore self-selecting, and were a mix 
of regulatees, advisers (i.e. consultants), and solicitors. The regulator was also interviewed, with 
questions focussing on the regulatee perception of the CRC. The demographic of the taxpayers varied. 
Interviewees came from a range of sectors including: higher education; construction; utilities; retail; 
transport and logistics; hospitality; the NHS; and local authorities. The study therefore consists of data 
from both the public and private sector. The data pool also includes organisations that only just fall 
under the scheme, as well as emitters at the top of the spectrum. The organisations emanate from across 
the UK and are not geographically limited. 
Overall, 31 interviews were undertaken by phone and face-to-face. The interviews were between 40 
and 75 minutes in length, with an average of 50 minutes. The mechanical approach to analysing these 
interviews involved transcribing and coding the data, to discover the pertinent themes of the data.39 
Importantly for this paper, the interviewees were not asked directly for their opinion on the reforms to 
the CRC other than: "What can you tell me about the 2012 reforms of the CRC?" Initially, this was a 
question that was introduced to gauge understanding of the CRC. However, it soon emerged that the 
reforms to the CRC played a fundamental role in the level of regulatee engagement with the scheme. 
28 out of 31 of the participants discussed the changing nature of the scheme without being directly 
questioned.    
 
Data Analysis 
I had not set out to explicitly discuss the number of reforms to the CRC with my interviewees. The 
multiple reforms did not form one of the questions asked of the interviewees. This aspect of the CRC 
was, however, raised by 27 out of 31 interviewees without stimulus.40 Four overarching themes that are 
relevant to notions of stability and domain/dexterity emerged from the data: a) the changing landscape 
of the CRC is attributable (by the interviewees) to political interference; b) the multiple changes to the 
CRC inhibit participant/advisor understanding of the scheme; c) the changes reduce the levels of 
engagement with the scheme by participants; and, d) there is an emotive disconnect with the CRC, and 
indeed wider policy, due to its instability. These four themes will now be explored in turn before using 
the relevant literature as a basis for analysis.  
As I set out in the introduction, this paper draws upon the ideas of stability and regulatory domain and 
dexterity; building upon the work of Stokes and wider economic literature. These ideas resonate with 
the changes to the CRC, and specifically, regulatee reactions to the numerous changes that have taken 
place during the scheme’s life. Economics literature argues that a stable framework is necessary for the 
formation of regulatee expectations and economic growth; Whilst Stokes using regulatory literature 
looks at how the regulatory landscape in a field is packaged by government. The two ideas are drawn 
from two different fields: economic literature and regulatory literature. It should be noted, that whilst 
Hayek and wider economic literature can be traced back to traditional theorists such as Hume and 
                                                          
38 Following an interview with the regulator, a short advert of the study was placed into a participant email 
update in March 2016. This advert contained contact details which allowed participants to come forward if they 
wanted to be interviewed.  
39 A. Coffee and P. Atikinson, Making Sense of Qualitative Data: Complimentary Research Strategies 
(Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1996); and T. Basit, ‘Manual or electronic? The role of coding in 
qualitative data analysis.’ (2003) 45(2) Educational research 143-154. 
40 Interviewees will be identified by an identifier code which has been attributed to each interview. An example 
of this is CRC M1. The letters prior to the number denote which pool of interview the interview is from. ‘P’ is 
an interview from the pilot study; ‘M’ an interview from the main study; and, ‘S’ an interview with a solicitor.  




Smith;41 Stokes relies heavily on policy documents (rather than other academic literature) as a basis for 
her argument. By bringing the two ideas together, this paper builds upon the debate set out by Stokes 
and Hayek and analyses the two ideas in light of an existing taxation scheme. This literature, along with 
other, relevant literature, will be woven through the study data to illustrate the effects of instability on 
the CRC. 
i. Taxpayers are perceptive 
The concept of regulatory domain is coupled with regulatory dexterity.42 Stokes discusses how the use 
of domain and dexterity is important in terms of how regulation is packaged by government, using 
fracking (the process – hydraulic fracturing - of injecting water at high pressure into underground rocks 
to extract oil and gas) as a case study. Stokes relies upon policy documents relating to fracking to situate 
her discussion. Domain and dexterity are antithetical in their meaning; in terms of time, domain 
represents continuity, whilst dexterity is change.43 In terms of focus, domain is broad, whilst dexterity 
is specific. Regarding regulatory response, domain is resisting reform, whilst dexterity introduces new, 
specific legislation.44 The two concepts are therefore contradictory.  
The high level of change seen under the CRC is more reflective of regulatory dexterity than domain. 
My participants suggested that political interference with the scheme was responsible for the high 
number of changes: 
“So, I actually felt sorry for the people that were trying to do it because they didn’t 
know what they were doing – you’ve got the political masters changing the rules.” 
(CRC P8) 
Economic literature has traditionally advocated against government interference with the economy.45 
Smith’s concept of justice also limited the role of government intervention to the protection against 
foreign foes and the maintenance of justice (which included property stability).46 Government 
intervention should be limited to those interventions that protected this stability, to the point that 
government intervention is seen as a positive when it protects these interests.47 Lippmann provides an 
alternative viewpoint through a proprietary rights lens: 
“Only by recognizing that legal rights are declared and enforced by the state is it 
possible to make a rational examination of the value of any particular right. The 
latter-day liberals did not see this. They fell into a deep and confusing error 
when they failed to see that property, contracts, corporations, as well as 
governments, electorates, and courts, are creatures of law, and have no 
existence except as bundles of enforceable rights and duties.”48 
Lippmann is arguing that these fundamental property rights (as well as other rights such as those under 
contracts) are, in fact, created by laws; and, as such, can be modified by law.49 This would indicate that 
there are circumstances which would justify the modification of laws and the introduction of instability 
(regulatory dexterity). Hayek agrees with this viewpoint in the sense that the economic freedom 
                                                          
41 This chapter will also draw on D. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (Oxford: OUP, 2000); and A. Smith, 
Wealth of Nations Books IV-V (London: Penguin, 1999). 
42 Stokes, above fn.19. 
43 Stokes, above fn.19, at 962. 
44 Stokes, above fn.19, at 962. 
45 Hume, above fn.41, chapter 2 
46 Smith, above fn.41, Book V 
47 Adam Viner, ‘Adam Smith and Laissez Faire’ (1927) 35(2) Journal of Political Economy 198, 220. 
48 Lippmann, above fn.16, 244. 
49 Lippmann, above fn.16, 245. 




advocated by Hume and Smith means economic freedom under the law, rather than an “absence of all 
government action”.50 Some political and legislative interference is therefore to be expected in taxation. 
However, since this “political interference” was “constantly changing” (CRC P8), participants 
considered there to be a higher than normal amount of reforms occurring to the CRC. This in turn meant 
that the changes were perceived as a criticism of the CRC: 
“A lot of the problems with CRC is the fact that they’ve changed the rules. When 
it came in in 2010 and there was a 2010 order, a 2011 order, a 2013 order and a 
2014 order so it’s a lot of changes.” (CRC R1)  
Since the frequency of changes was so high, this was considered political “tinkering” with the scheme 
(CRC S3, CRC S5). One interviewee linked this tinkering to the wider green taxation landscape; where 
they stated that the government has “a habit of changing taxation” (CRC M6). The language 
surrounding the changes was not impersonal. Participants thought the changes were intimately linked 
with government interference 
This is not to say that there is not a role for regulatory dexterity in a regulatory field. Amongst the 
backdrop that some government intervention is to be expected in the economic field,51 regulatory 
domain and dexterity can work well together. They can provide justification for one another in the sense 
that “[o]ne reason for invoking 'dexterity', for example, is that it is underpinned by an ostensibly sound 
and solid 'domain'.”52 Dexterity and domain can also protect each other from criticisms: an example 
provided by Stokes is that any concerns that the law is too broad or slow can be alleviated by the 
swiftness of regulatory dexterity.53 In essence, the two concepts are complementary to one another, 
despite their differences.54 Stokes argues that, with fracking, both approaches are taken as part of a 
policy agenda: a resistance to reform the existing legislative framework under which fracking arguably 
falls (regulatory domain); whilst introducing specific pieces of legislation to plug any gaps left by that 
overarching regulatory framework (regulatory dexterity).55  
The CRC has a single piece of parent legislation – the Climate Change Act 200856 – but sits within, on 
the national level, a wider energy consumption and carbon emissions regulatory framework and, at the 
international level, a further host of climate change linked emissions agreements. Further afield still are 
energy efficiency regulations such as other taxes on energy consumption/ carbon emissions include the 
European Emissions Trading Scheme; and the CCL (including the regulation of Climate Change 
Agreements).57 Moving away from taxes, the CRC sits alongside other regulatory schemes such as the 
Energy Savings Opportunity Scheme (ESOS). Using this wider definition of the ‘energy efficiency 
domain’, I would suggest that the regulatory domain, whilst forming part of a policy agenda, is also a 
physical projection of that policy, and in this case green policy. A broad, overarching, stable framework 
allows those who are regulated (including taxpayers) to understand the position of the government and 
engage with it.  
Interviewees have explicitly attributed the changes to the CRC to the government meaning that they 
make the link between the changes and policy. This sort of connection may be somewhat unsurprising 
and what I would otherwise expect even in the absence of my data. What this means, however, is that 
a strong and stable regulatory domain is therefore a reflection of stable policy underlying the regulatory 
                                                          
50 Hayek, above fn.15, 329. 
51 Hayek, above fn.15, 329. 
52 Stokes, above fn.19, 983. 
53 Stokes, above fn.19, 984. 
54 Stokes, above fn.19, 984. 
55 Stokes, above fn.19. 
56 Climate Change Act 2008 
57 Introduced in the Finance Act 2000.  




field. As will be discussed below, this has impacts on the emotional response of the CRC participant 
towards the government and policy. First, two practical impacts of the changes will be considered: the 
impact on understanding, and the impact on engagement with the scheme. 
ii. Regulatees are not as willing/ able to engage with the CRC 
The instability of the CRC has influenced regulatee engagement in two key, practical ways: 
Regulatees have a lower level of understanding of the scheme; and, regulatees emotionally disconnect 
from the scheme and are less willing to engage. It is unsurprising that the constant changes to the 
CRC have affected the understanding participants have of the scheme. Two main themes emerged 
from the data regarding such knowledge. The first was that the frequency of the changes made it hard 
to ‘catch up’, and the second was that participants had been able to settle into a routine because there 
had been no substantive changes to the scheme for the last 2-3 years (apart from the abolition of the 
scheme). This lack of understanding or currency under the CRC makes it difficult for participants to 
know how to behave or comply with the scheme.  
In the institutional literature, institutions “are the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are 
the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction.”58 As such, institutions “reduce 
uncertainty” by providing a structure that shapes everyday life so that people know how to behave – 
for example, North talks of how we know how to drive a car, how to conduct a sales transaction, and 
how to start a business.59 The same could be said of taxes – institutional certainty tells us how we pay 
our taxes. If, as is the case with the CRC, that institutional stability is lacking, then this could affect 
the participants’ ability to know how to conduct themselves under the scheme. Once again, this 
institutional stability should not come at the expense of stagnation. North argues that change is 
necessary: 
“The major role of institutions in a society is to reduce uncertainty by 
establishing a stable (but not necessarily efficient) structure to human 
interaction. But the stability of institutions in no way gainsays the fact that they 
are changing. From conventions, codes of conduct, and norms of behaviour to 
statute law, and common law, and contracts between individuals, institutions are 
evolving and, therefore, are continually altering the choices available to us […] 
institutions typically change incrementally rather than in discontinuous 
fashion.”60 
The difficulty here lies in the character rather than the volume of changes.61 As with the rule of law 
approach adopted by Hayek, it is not the fact that the law is changing creates the problems. Following 
institutional stability, changes come incrementally. In the case of the CRC, therefore, it is important to 
avoid regular overhauls of the scheme that would then alter how much tax participants would be paying 
under the scheme. Smith has also considered this concept, as he draws on the idea of institutions in his 
own work.62 He argues that if taxation is to be imposed, then it should be in accordance with the 
“generally accepted” canons of taxation.63 The key canon of interest here is the canon of certainty. 
Smith argues that “the time of payment, the amount to be paid ought all to be clear and plain to the 
contributor and to every other person”.64 
                                                          
58 North, above fn.17, 3 
59 North, above fn.17, 3-4 
60 North, above fn.17, 6. 
61 Hayek, above fn.15, 331. 
62 A. Skinner, A System of Social Science: Papers Relating to Adam Smith (Clarendon Press 1979), 209. 
63 Skinner, above fn.62, 216. 
64 Smith, above fn.41. 




With annual changes to the scheme in the first half of its life, some of this certainty is lost as participants 
struggled to keep track of the CRC rules to ensure compliance (CRC P8). Effort and resources were 
required to follow the changes and understand them (CRC M15). 
“Because the person working in their business, who’s not from an energy 
background, and hasn’t been kept in the loop with the changes in the legislation 
- I really don’t think would have any chance of truly understanding how CRC 
works.” (CRC M3)  
This interviewee discusses the need to closely follow the changes in the CRC, to have a chance of 
understanding the scheme. The changes were viewed as a burden that acted as a drain on expertise, time 
and physical resources.65 Participants have struggled to keep up with the significant changes (CRC R1), 
and so struggled to understand the scheme (CRC P3). The frequent changes also placed a burden on 
participants, as resources (for example time and expertise) were needed to understand the CRC. 
Solicitors and consultants also raised the problem of coming to grips with the scheme: 
“Because there’s been so many changes and there’s been so many changes of 
terminology, it is very difficult sometimes to provide clients with very clear 
advice without boring them and going into lots of detail.” (CRC S2)  
The changes make it difficult for advisors to give concise, and accurate, advice on the CRC whilst 
engaging their clients. Advisors also had a “tough three or four years” coming to grips with the scheme 
relearning the rules as they changed (CRC M7). Whilst another participant believed that the scheme was 
too complex for consultants to understand: 
“You’ve got a compliance scheme, you set yourself up, then suddenly they 
change the rules. Then you’ve got to change again. There’s a lot of time and effort 
and you can’t afford to get it wrong. And I'm also aware that some of the 
consultants out there did not understand it. I know some people took advice from 
consultants which was misleading.” (CRC P8) 
The regularity with which the CRC has changed over the years has led to difficulties in understanding 
the scheme, both by participants and by their advisors. This level of regular reform and regulatory 
complexity (even for specialist advisors) may be of concern, and it has potential impacts throughout the 
scheme in terms of compliance and engagement. Any incorrect understanding would filter down from 
the advisors to the participants. The regularity of the changes is also resource heavy and requires both 
participants and advisors to actively engage with each issue of new CRC legislation enacted to ensure a 
current understanding of the scheme.  
The CRC scheme had settled down following the reforms which were implemented at the start of phase 
2 (April 2014), and no further changes were applied to the scheme prior to the announcement of its 
abolition in March 2016. The CRC therefore experienced its first taste of stability between April 2014 
and March 2016. This period of stability had been picked up by participants, in what they referred to as 
“business as usual” (CRC M7) phase:  
“Only now really, especially post-ESOS do we feel like we're finally in a position 
where CRC has settled down. It's become a routine. It's been more incentivised. 
There's more focus on energy efficiency improvement, etc.” (CRC M10)  
Several interviewees expressed negative emotion towards the abolition of the CRC purely because they 
did not want to see another change.66 Specifically because the CRC will be replaced by something else 
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(CRC M12). From the data, there seemed to be a level of fear of the unknown. These responses show 
two things. First, that regulatees can perceive and respond positively to stability. Second, that instability 
coupled with the unknown has created positive emotion towards what is currently in place (i.e. the CRC), 
and negative emotion towards what is to come. This may prove problematic in enacting the CRC’s 
replacement and driving regulatees to engage with it.  
This negative emotion towards the abolition of the CRC has also spread to the wider scheme itself and 
has resulted in lower levels of engagement with the scheme. Historically, the argument put forward by 
Hayek for the need of “a permanent legal framework which enables the individual to plan with a degree 
of confidence”,67 also draws roots from property rights arguments. As a tax regime changes, the levying 
process also changes and can include changes in how much tax is levied and/ or the way in which the 
tax is levied. Stability therefore has “large consequences” for property,68 as it will indirectly enhance 
any property rights.69 It provides a “robust private sphere” for taxpayers.70  Hume argues that one of the 
three fundamental laws of nature is stability of possession.71 This stability is key, he argues, to the growth 
of society: 
“There are three different species of goods, which we are possess’d of; the 
internal satisfaction of our mind, the external advantages of our body, and the 
enjoyment of such possessions as we have acquir’d by our industry and good 
fortune. We are perfectly secure in our enjoyment of the first. The second may 
be ravish’d from us, but can be of no advantage to him who deprives us of 
them. The last only are both expos’d to the violence of others, and may be 
transferr’d without suffering any loss or alteration; while at the same time, there 
is not a sufficient quantity of them to supply every one’s desires and necessities. 
As the improvement, therefore, of these goods is the chief advantage of 
society, so the instability of their possession, along with their scarcity, is the 
chief impediment.” (Emphasis added)72 
The stability of possession of property is therefore key for societal security; and, according to Hume, 
this stability must be inflexibly applied to the whole of society.73 More specifically to business 
engagement and stability, Smith argues: 
“Commerce and manufactures can seldom flourish long in any state which does 
not enjoy a regular administration of justice; in which people feel themselves 
secure in the possession of their property...”74 
Smith is arguing here that without some level of stability in possession, business cannot flourish. More 
recent literature also considers the role of tax stability on property. An unstable regulatory regime, and 
particularly a tax regime (which requires money to be paid to the Treasury), does not provide this 
property stability. The Mirrlees Review reiterated the importance of stability, stating that, alongside 
simplicity and neutrality, stability was a factor to be considered when assessing a tax system.75 As they 
put it: 
“Tax systems that continually change impose greater compliance costs on those who are 
taxed. They lead to difficulties in making long-term plans. Lack of stability can impact 
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negatively on investment decisions by firms and on saving and investment decisions by 
individuals.”76 
Regulatory stability “is widely considered to be important to promote investment in general”.77 Black 
argues that businesses should be able to operate in “a stable regulatory environment”.78 It is the 
negative impacts of instability in this long-term engagement that is particularly interesting. 
Importantly, I am not advocating the permanent stagnation of legislation,79 rather, a level of stability 
that allows for taxpayer investment into the particular regulatory scheme. Whilst the abolition of the 
CRC, and the unknown that follows, has created some positive feelings towards the CRC; there has 
largely been a lack of engagement with the changing scheme. This disengagement can be categorised 
into two camps: a general disengagement with the scheme; and an unwillingness to invest financially 
into the scheme.  
Stability of policy can create co-operation and engagement under a regulatory scheme.80 The converse, 
with the CRC, saw my participants “fed up” (CRC R1), “discouraged” (CRC P3), an acceptance that 
the CRC is just a cost that needs to be paid (CRC M6), and loss of confidence in the scheme (CRC S3). 
One interviewee stated: 
“It just bores people. When you do a seminar explaining the rules and what has 
changed year on year, people actually fall asleep.” (CRC M8)  
Thus, I saw a general disengagement with a scheme that constantly changes. The emotions of being 
bored and fed up would also indicate that this the changes are not a new thing for participants, and the 
fact regulatees have become bored with constant change indicates the presence of too much change.  
This disengagement extends to investing into the scheme and measures which promote energy 
efficiency. The nature of taxation is that it deprives the taxpayer (the regulatee) of their own property, 
which is justified through the consent of their elected representatives.81 Without this certainty under the 
CRC, investment simply will not happen. One interviewee explains: 
“I think a key concern you hear over and over again is certainty and confidence. 
And I think all of these schemes work best if businesses have the confidence to 
invest in equipment and management tools and structures and so on. And I think 
it is difficult to do that when they’re lacking certainty and confidence.” (CRC S3)  
As business cases for investment are based on returns, an uncertain scheme means that incentives could 
be removed, or the scheme changed in such a way that the returns are never realised. As such, regulatees 
are reluctant to invest into energy reducing measures for the CRC, because “there’s no certainty about 
their returns” (CRC S4). This was particularly pertinent due to the uncertainty of the future of the 
scheme, and the fact that there was the risk that the CRC would simply “go away anyway”, rendering 
any significant investment into the scheme pointless (CRC M5). In addition, one interviewee suggested 
that the link between paying the tax and reducing emissions had been lost during the changes of the 
scheme – meaning that they were less inclined to engage and invest in energy reducing measures (CRC 
M6).  
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The changing landscape of the CRC therefore invokes negative emotions in the regulatee and a 
disengagement from the scheme. This disengagement is not only emotional but is demonstrated in an 
unwillingness to invest financially into the scheme. This in turn reduces the ability of the CRC to lower 
carbon emissions – as it is through the investment into energy efficiency projects that reductions in 
energy consumption (and thus emissions) can be realised. The CRC is, to some, simply a cost that is to 
be swallowed rather than engaged with.  
Since the changes in the CRC are seen to be attributable to political interference, the disengagement not 
only has implications for the scheme itself, but also links back to the creators of the scheme. There is 
therefore a potential drop in wider regulatee confidence in the government.  
iii. How regulation is packaged is important 
Tax stability was one limb of coalition government policy. Here, one of the principles for corporate 
tax reform was stated to be “maintaining stability” in the Corporate Tax Road Map of 2010.82 Smith 
also made a link between stability and confidence: 
“Commerce and manufactures, in short, can seldom flourish in any state in which 
there is not a certain degree of confidence in the justice of government.”83 
Hayek also argues that there needs to be a stability, which “enables the individual to plan with a degree 
of confidence”.84 In the area of taxation, this is particularly pertinent as Skinner highlights: 
“Government, while bound by the laws of political economy, is by the same token 
faced with the necessity of understanding them and being capable of 
implementing policies which are appropriate to particular cases […] a point 
which is especially important in the discussion of taxation and debt – areas where 
the government is peculiarly liable to offend the people and to be constrained by 
the necessity of preserving some ‘degree of confidence in the justice of 
government’”.85 
In order to preserve a level of confidence, Snape argues that it is important to winnow out the 
unnecessary changes from the necessary; and it is the government’s skill at doing this that represents 
the strength of the tax and how the tax will be accepted.86 It is important in this context, therefore, to 
consider whether the taxpayer considers the changes to the CRC to have been “necessary”.87 Any 
unnecessary changes are “in the language of my times, a matter of credibility”.88 
An interesting example to illustrate this point can be seen in the changes to the CRC revenues. 
Although the revenues now go to the Treasury, this was not always the plan. The revenues were 
originally ring-fenced to go back to taxpayers/ regulatees, depending on their performance under the 
scheme. The government changed this in 2010, where it was decided that the revenues “will be used 
to support the public finances, including spending on the environment, rather than recycled to 
participants”.89 In the interviewees’ minds, this has led to a drop in credibility for the scheme: 
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 “And then as soon as the new coalition government came in, they scrapped that 
within about four months I think, and just said, “No, we’re going to keep the 
money. Whatever you pay for allowances, we’re going to keep it, because there 
won’t be any revenue recycling going on.” And at that point, everybody just said, 
“That’s a tax then.”” (CRC M16)  
And;  
“Yeah so the simplification. But the simplification didn’t come across as 
simplification so much as a tax grab.” (CRC M6)  
"That's a tax then" and "tax grab" are two phrases that label the CRC in quite a negative way. The idea 
is that the CRC is just a government revenue raising tax. The constant changes illustrated, therefore, a 
shift from an energy efficiency scheme to an energy tax. This shift undermined the environmental aims 
behind the CRC,90 and this was perceived by interviewees as a positive policy decision by the 
government to place revenue raising above environmental aims.  
Once the revenue recycling element of the CRC was removed, and the revenues went to the Treasury, 
one interviewee questioned the motives of the government: 
“But I think if it goes into general taxation and just gets lost, I think you are at 
risk of saying, “You’re just taxing us because you can and you’re not taxing us 
to actually drive change.” So, I think one needs to be very careful how one frames 
the taxation.” (CRC M16)  
This incremental move away from the environmental aims of the CRC through various changes forms 
the basis of the loss of confidence. These changes have then been linked back by interviewees to the 
underlying policy of the government. I argue that this change has created a new standpoint regarding 
stability. The regulatees, in their minds, have already hypothecated the revenues of the CRC for 
environmental gain (i.e. those that reduced their energy consumption the most, would receive more 
money out of the revenues) and this change has clearly been labelled as a policy move by government; 
leading reduced levels of confidence. 
Beyond the revenue changes of the CRC, the other reforms that the CRC has undergone are, therefore, 
also a reflection of government policy in the eyes of the regulatees.91 They interpret the changes and 
identify a shift in policy towards a policy that they are less engaged with: 
“I think within the industry we’ve become very disillusioned with what the 
government are doing at the moment and it needs to be what you’re joining up 
to, and if the government has got the policies in place and the right reasons for 
doing it, and then that falls down on the institutions to play their part, then they 
will do. But at the moment, it’s a pure tax and we see the government going in a 
certain direction, it makes it very difficult to get people to engage really.” (CRC 
P5, own emphasis added)  
This means that, in Stokesian terms, the packaging of regulation, in terms of how changes to the CRC 
have been portrayed, is important.92 Participants are able to interpret these changes and perceive them 
to be manifestations of larger policy. As such, the frequent and unnecessary changes have led 
participants of the CRC to question the motives and policy of the government: 
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"From a university’s point of view, certainly from some people, I think they see 
it as just a way of generating income and maybe more of a taxation, particularly 
this government, and maybe it’s more about just getting the money in, rather than 
necessarily the commitment to improve the carbon performance of organisations, 
because we don’t necessarily see other drivers from government on this." (CRC 
P6) 
And; 
"[T]he very strange position of a government who’s making commitments about 
energy or carbon reduction, but at the same time effectively dismantling an 
otherwise successful renewables sector without thinking it through" (CRC S5) 
The interviewees have identified a disparity in what the government was claiming to do, and what the 
reforms to the CRC and other environmental schemes have reflected in practice. There was the view 
that the government was "reneging" on its environmental promises, in favour of generating revenues 
from taxes (CRC P1). The instability of the CRC also has, in participants' eyes, roots throughout the 
energy efficiency landscape. CRC S4 summarised as follows: "for God’s sake let’s have a proper 
coherent energy policy that ties in together." In 2015, the Conservative government held a public 
consultation on "reforming the business energy efficiency landscape" with a view "to simplify and 
improve the effectiveness of the landscape".93 This move to potentially further change the CRC (and 
which did result in the abolition of the CRC), was viewed with some scepticism by interviewees. When 
asked whether they would respond to the consultation, one interviewee opined: 
"I think all the clients I work for, everybody thought it (the CRC) was going to 
be cancelled. So, they all thought, “Oh there’s no point responding because it’s 
going to be cancelled”, do you know what I mean?" (CRC M7) 
M7 insinuates here that the government already had a policy agenda before the consultation began; and 
as such, there was little point in trying to change that agenda through a consultation response. This was 
reiterated by CRC P4, who was "cynical" that the consultations would ever change the position of the 
government. As such, not only has there been a disengagement with the CRC, but also a disengagement 
with policy. The result of this is, is that the CRC no longer has any credibility as an environmental 
scheme (CRC S5) and participants see the government as disingenuous due, in part, to the multiple and 
many CRC changes.  
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
Without prompting, participants wanted to talk about the numerous changes to the CRC and, and more 
importantly, they attributed the changes to political interference with the scheme (i.e. change without 
any ‘good’ cause). There have been two practical responses to these changes: 1) there is now a general 
lack of understanding of the CRC; and 2) these changes mean that participants are less engaged with the 
scheme. The CRC is too unstable to invest in energy reducing programmes and guarantee their payback. 
However, this link back to political interference runs deeper, and has manifested into an emotive 
response: a lack of confidence in wider government 'green' policy. This connection with the underlying 
policy means that, in the participants' eyes, the CRC scheme as a whole lacks credibility. It is this 
emotional consequence of the changes that are particularly interesting, and resonates with aspects of tax 
and regulatory literature, which have been raised.  
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In his speech to the Department of Energy and Climate Change in 2010, David Cameron stated that he 
wanted “to be the greenest government ever”.94 These words were repeated verbatim by interviewees 
during the study (CRC P3, M6, M13, S4), but with incredulity. The CRC has undergone much reform 
during its lifetime, but so has the energy efficiency landscape more generally.95 The instability has 
therefore spread throughout the regulatory domain. As a result, what is left is an overarching framework 
which comprises of piecemeal, regularly changing legislation and secondary schemes, lacking the 
constant regulatory domain that Stokes discusses. This lack of stability (or domain) has led interviewees 
to doubt the policy commitments which have been communicated publicly by the government. The 
individual scheme, in this case the CRC, loses credibility, and as a result, suffers a drop in engagement 
from participants of the scheme. They are far less willing to invest time and resources into a tax regime 
that lacks credibility and is prone to change.  
This paper has explored how regulatees have perceived the series of regular reforms to the CRC. 
Regulatees have made the link between the regular changes to the CRC and a political motivation. This, 
in turn, has allowed the regulatee to “map” what they think the underlying policy behind energy 
efficiency is. This perceived policy diverges from the “green government” image that the government 
is keen to portray; and regulatees have started to disengage, not only from the CRC, but from energy 
efficiency policy in general. The data shows a reduction in regulatee confidence, and a correlating 
reduction in government credibility is demonstrated. 
There has already been empirical work conducted on how regulatees respond to regulation.96 Stability 
has also been discussed in other fields. Gracia discusses the role of stability being defined through 
relational interactions between the regulator and regulatee to build stability from the ground up: 
From a Bourdieusian perspective, relative stability and certainty in the tax 
compliance game emerges from the relational interactions, or collusion, of the 
dominant player (tax professionals and the tax authority), which maintains 
HMRC’s illusion of legitimacy to control, act and regulation the field.97 
The ability to improve and maintain legitimacy would be useful for the CRC, which, as I have discussed 
has lost some credibility in the eyes of the interviewees. However, as the problem here stems not from 
the regulator, but the government, it would be difficult for the Environment Agency to build up stability 
and therefore improve legitimacy themselves.  
The concept of legitimacy also figures in the work of Gunningam and Sinclair. They specifically raise 
the legitimacy of regulation as a motivational factor for regulatees.98 However, this motivation for 
compliance runs much deeper: to the legitimacy of policy. They argue: 
It may also be that a prosecution policy that is perceived to be fundamentally 
unfair is undermining the general belief in the legitimacy of regulatory 
requirements. Certainly, there is evidence from other studies that if regulated 
enterprises mistrust the regulator and believe that regulations are being used 
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strategically, with regard to purposes and values with which they fundamentally 
disagree, then they are far less motivated to comply with these requirements.99 
As such, where the regulatory scheme or policy underlying it is perceived to be unfair and/or 
unreasonable, the law loses legitimacy and the regulatees lose the commitment to comply.100 The 
prosecution policy that is perceived to be unfair can be widened to governmental policy. The legitimacy 
of this policy that underpins the CRC can have wide-ranging impacts on compliance. Whilst 
Gunningham and Sinclair discuss legitimacy in terms of unfairness, I believe this stretches to arbitrary 
and unnecessarily changing policy. Here, unnecessary (or, to merge vocabulary, unreasonable) changes 
result in a drop in credibility.101 For Gunningham and Sinclair, unreasonable policy leads to a drop in 
legitimacy. The connection between the two: they both result in less engagement from regulatees.  
How the regulatory field is packaged is then important as a means of potentially overcoming this loss 
of credibility and engagement. Interviewees demonstrated a disengagement with governmental ‘green’ 
policy due to its lack of consistency, and this in turn has led to a disengagement with the specific CRC 
scheme itself. Drawing together the concepts of regulatory domain and dexterity, interviewees 
demonstrated that the stable (domain) and the changing (dexterity) also reflect policy decisions. Stable 
policy is reflected in stable regulation, whilst unstable policy is reflected in a constantly changing 
regulation. 
In the interviewees’ minds, the changes to the CRC were unnecessarily frequent. When this was 
expanded to consider the bigger picture, the government’s green policy is also seen by interviewees as 
unstable, due to the prevalence of regulatory dexterity. Snape’s comments on credibility and instability, 
and Hayek’s comments on confidence resonate in a regulatory landscape that lacks constancy, or 
domain. If an individual tax’s instability can call in to question its credibility, so can the instability of 
the policy that underpins it as interviewees made the link between the unstable CRC, and unstable green 
policy. As such, any loss of credibility in terms of the CRC also resonates throughout the government’s 
green policy. A lack of stable policy in this context has made regulatees question the motivations of the 
government in introducing and reforming the CRC. This, in turn, has resulted in a disengagement with 
the CRC, or a drop-in motivation to go beyond compliance. This loss of motivation to go beyond 
compliance is demonstrated through a reluctance to invest in energy efficiency schemes. The instability 
of the regulatory landscape in this area has a direct impact on businesses being able to guarantee a 
payback on their investments. 
Therefore, the nature of how regulation is packaged is critical. The CRC shows that the action or 
inaction of the government in terms of changing regulation forms the basis of how the regulatory 
landscape in an area is perceived. For those subject to regulation, a resistance to reform, or a regulatory 
domain, portrays an image of stability; whilst regulatory dexterity portrays instability. That is not to say 
that regulatory dexterity is an inherently bad thing. However, the data suggests that regulatees will not 
be able to identify a coherent policy without an underlying regulatory domain to link this policy to. 
Take this underlying regulatory domain away, and regulatees can lose confidence in policy – for this 
regulatory domain is the clearest physical representation of policy. Regulation should be packaged as 
stable and unchanging in its early phases and once this has been established, individual taxes can be 
reformed to iron out any specific inadequacies, and dexterity can be introduced.  
With stability comes regulatee engagement and understanding. Regulatees are much happier to go 
beyond compliance, and invest in energy efficiency projects, when the stability is there to ensure such 
projects will provide a guaranteed payback. An individual scheme that changes too regularly will also 
be hard to follow for regulatees, and can lead to regulatees losing interest in the environmental 
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objectives of the scheme. Having a stable, overarching energy efficiency policy may offset some of 
these effects in individual schemes, like the CRC, that are later considered to be inadequate by 
policymakers. As such, dexterity can combine with domain to produce regulatee perceptions of stability. 
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